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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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II. REPLY ARGUMENT
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order made no ruling whether
the Perpetual Easement Agreement was unenforceable because it lacked a
sufficient legal description.
Tiller White provides no legal argument whatsoever contradicting or challenging the
facts, law and legal arguments asserted by Canyon Outdoor for reversal of the district court's
ruling that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was unenforceable against Tiller White because it
was protected as a bona fide purchaser under Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812. Due to the lack
of any challenging argument, it appears Tiller White concedes to the facts, law and legal analysis
asserted by Canyon Outdoor in support of the proposition that Tiller White was not a bona fide
purchaser protected under the statutes warranting reversal of the district court's decision
articulated in its Memorandum Decision and Order entered on June 4, 2015.
Instead, Tiller White raises a new issue of whether the easement was enforceable in either
law or equity, because it lacked a sufficient legal description as an alternative theory to affirm
the district court's ruling.
Therefore, without repeating the facts, law and legal arguments provided in its
Appellant's Brief for the reasons and analysis explaining why Tiller White was not a bona fide
purchaser in this case, Canyon Outdoor wiil focus its arguments specific to the arguments raised
in Respondent's Brief.
For purposes of clarity and understanding, the Memorandum Decision and Order entered
by the district court pertaining only to its ruling that the easement agreement was unenforceable
against Tiller White stated the following at the outset:
Plaintiff argues that the easement agreement is unenforceable because it has no
legal description and was unrecorded. Defendant argues that it is enforceable
because of the doctrine of full/part performance and because Plaintiff failed to do
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,...,u.c,v,u..•uis,

investigation to
is dispositive. 1
was a

purchaser under Idaho Code§§ 55-606 and 55-812. Based on the district court's ruling it
can be reasonably inferred that due to the non-recording of the easement agreement, Tiller White
had no actual or constructive knowledge of Canyon Outdoor' s easement and therefore its
minimal investigation was reasonable and imposed no duty on Tiller White to investigate further.
Other than the parties' legal argument in suppor1 of their respective positions on the
easement issue, the district court did not address the sufficiency of the legal description provided
in the Perpetual Easement Agreement as a basis that the easement agreement was unenforceable.
Notwithstanding, Canyon Outdoor will address the new issue and provide an explanation
for the reasons the issue is irrelevant and not dispositive.

B. The Perpetual Easement Agreement was valid and enforceable under the
doctrines of full and part performances satisfying the Statute of Frauds.
In the alternative, Tiller White argues that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was invalid
because it did not contain a sufficient legal description. In support of the argument, it refers to
Idaho's"statute of Frauds contained in Idaho Code§§ 9-503. Idaho Code§ 9-503 states:

9-503. Transfers of real property to be in writing. - No estate or interest in
real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation
of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.
Tiller White cites Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 (2004)
and Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009) for the legal proposition that an
agreement is invalid if it does not contain a sufficient legal description. However, Lexington
1 See

Memorandwn Decision and Order, R, p.131.
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most importantly, in both cases,

both cases
than a
sellers

rescinded the agreements and did not perform its obligation in the agreements by conveying

the property. In the instant case, the evidence is undisputed that the original parties to the
Perpetual Easement Agreement, i.e. the Knapps and Canyon Outdoor, did in fact, convey an
easement interest. Tiller White is now attempting to rescind the agreement made between the
Knapps and Canyon Outdoor for which no evidence in the record exists that disputes its
performance.
Tiller White's argument is an attempt to bootstrap or "step into the shoes" of its
predecessors-in-interest to now assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense to the Perpetual
Easement Agreement with Canyon Outdoor. However, Tiller White ignores the fact that its
predecessors-in-interest admitted that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was fully performed
taking it outside the requirements of the Statute of Frauds which admission applies to Tiller
White.
Thus, the issue is not whether the Perpetual Easement Agreement between Canyon
Outdoor and the Knapps, now Tiller White, is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but
instead whether Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-606 and
Idaho Code§ 55-812 when it acquired the property from the Knapps. As previously explained
and briefed, Tiller White was not a bona fide purchaser protected under the statutes and Idaho
law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the legal doctrines of part and/or full performance satisfy
the Statute of Frauds and are applicable in this case.
In Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 6

performance and what acts under

Simons, two brothers and their wives, Newell and Carol

the

doctrine

Joel

DeLila ("DeLila"), were joint owners of 1500 to 1800 acres of farmland. See id., 134 Idaho at
826, 11 P.3d at 22. Newell also owned a house and approximately 60 acres given to him by his
mother who had also given DeLila a home and land. See id. All of the property was subject a
Federal Land Bank Mortgage which went into default. See id. The parties discussed possible
alternatives in lieu of foreclosure on the farmland and it was agreed that DeLila would file a
Chapter 12 bankruptcy to save the property. See id. To avoid participation in the bankruptcy,
Newell quitclaimed their interest in the farmland, their house and the approximately 60 acres to
DeLila which they agreed that once the Federal Land Bank debt was satisfied they would convey
back the home and 60 acres back to Newell. See id. The parties executed a memorandum
reflecting their intentions concerning the property which simply described the property as "tract
#5 Home and 60 acres." See id.
Newell was notified that the debt was paid off by DeLila and demanded that the house
and 60 acres be conveyed back to them which DeLila refused. See id. Newell filed a complaint
for specific performance of the orai agreement as outlined in the written memorandum which
DeLila denied and asserted various defenses, including the Statute of Frauds. See id, 134 Idaho
at 827, 11 P.3d at 23.
Following the trial, the district court ruled in favor of Newell and ordered DeLila to
convey the home and 60 acres to Newell. See id., 134 Idaho at 826, 11 P.3d at 22. DeLila
appealed. See id.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed DeLila' s defense of the Statute of Frauds.
The Court noted that DeLila admitted that there was some kind of agreement with Newell but it
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 7
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The Court rejected DeLila's defense and noted that Newell fully performed their part of
the agreement. See id In rejecting the defense, the Court explained the doctrine of part
performance as follows:

Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to convey real
property fails to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the
agreement may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the purchaser has
partly performed the agreement. (Citation omitted). "What constitutes part
performance must depend upon the particular facts of each case and the
sufficiency of particular acts is a matter of law." (Citation omitted). "The
most important acts which constitute a sufficient part performance are
actual possession, permanent and valuable improvements and these two
combined." (Citation omitted). The acts constituting part performance must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and they must be definitely
referable to the alleged oral contract. (Citation omitted).

Id, 134 Idaho at 827, 11 P.3d at 23. (Emphasis added).
The Court held that Newell performed their part of the agreement and all that remained
was DeLila to perform her part. See id
Next, the Court addressed the use of parol evidence to avoid application of the Statute of
Frauds. The Court ruled as follows:
Parol evidence is necessary to properly construe the intent of the parties in this
case and to properly identify the property to be conveyed to Newell and Carol.
For example, the reference to "tract#5" in the written memorandum is ambiguous.
There is no "tract #5." Extrinsic evidence was necessary to explain the
agreement, not to vary, contradict, or enlarge its terms. The agreement executed
by the parties does not set forth the entirety of the understanding between the
parties. The extrinsic evidence clearly established that the property to be
reconveyed was the home and acreage given to Newell by his mother in 1957.
The extrinsic evidence also established that the written agreement was part of a
larger agreement that included the conveyance by Newell and Carol of the 1500
to 1800 acres to Joel and DeLila-property which DeLila now owns exclusive of
any interests in Newell and Carol.
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134 Idaho at 828, 11 P.3d at 24.
8

V.

reaffirmed the standard for the application

the

of part

performance and stated:
The doctrine of part performance provides that when the parties to an agreement
fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of
frauds, the agreement "may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the
purchaser has partly performed the agreement." (Citations omitted). Part
performance is predicated on the existence of an agreement. (Citation
omitted). To specifically enforce a contract to sell real property by operation of
the doctrine of part performance, the agreement must be complete, definite, and
certain in all its terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of
being reduced to certainty. (Citation omitted).
As discussed above, the agreement to convey the 4.9 acres is not an enforceable
agreement under the statute of frauds because it lacks an adequate property
description. Part performance does not substitute for an incomplete
agreement, but instead operates to allow an agreement to be enforced when it
does not comply with the statute of frauds. (Citation omitted). ("There can be
no part performance of an agreement which was never made.").

Id., 149 Idaho at 92-93, 233 P.3d at 23-24. (Emphasis added).
In Haroldsen, the Court held that Bauchman-Kingston failed to satisfy the doctrine of
part performance to take the agreement outside of the statute of frauds by distinguishing the

Simons decision in that the parties did not fully deliver the consideration in the agreement. See
id, 149 Idaho at 93, 233 P.3d at 24.
In Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 729 P .2d 1068 (App.1986), the Idaho Court of
Appeals also provided an explanation of the doctrines of full performance and part performance
as it applied to the Statute of Frauds in Idaho. The Court of Appeals explained:

When we use the term "full" performance, without qualification, we mean
performance of all obligations by both sides to a contract. It is universally
recognized that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to a contract fully
performed by both sides. WILLISTON§ 528, AT 727-28. Idaho's statute, by
its own terms, governs contracts "to be performed. . ." Moreover, the object of
the statute is to prevent potential fraud by forbidding disputed assertions of
enumerated kinds of contracts without any written basis. This purpose is
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 9

fully satisfied when the parties themselves accept the contract and mutually
perform it. For the same reason, the statute of frauds is inapplicable when a
although not fully performed by both sides is mutually acknowledged to
see,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
85 Idaho 551,381 P.2d 802 (1
111 Idaho at 1008-09, 729 P.2d at 1071-72. (Emphasis added).

We turn to "part" performance. When we use this term, we mean
performance by either or both parties of less than all their respective
obligations under the contract. There is no literal foundation in I.C. § 9-505
for the oft-made assertion that part performance takes a contract outside the
statute. Plainly it does not. The contract is still within the statute. At least a
portion of the contract remains "to be performed" on both sides. Compare
I.C. § 9-504 (explicitly referring to part performance of land sale contracts
under I.C. § 9-503). Rather, it is more accurate to say that in some
circumstances, part performance may establish an equitable ground to avoid
the strictures of the statute of frauds.
Id., 111 Idaho at 1009, 729 P.2d at 1072. (Emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals went on to discuss the remedy afforded when part performance is
completed by one side and held as follows:
Although Idaho courts have not explicitly addressed this issue, our cases strongly
point to the equity approach. The Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that
when one party has fully performed an oral contract within the statute of frauds,
he is not entitled to collect damages for a breach. Rather, he is entitled to the
equitable remedy of specific performance. (Citations omitted).
These cases put Idaho among a minority of states, but we think the equity
approach is sound. It offers greater consistency with the literal language of
Idaho's statute of frauds.
Id., 111 Idaho at 1009-10, 729 P.2d at 1072-73.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court addressed the doctrine of part
performance in relation to Tiller White's argument that the Sign Lease was unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds because it lacked a sufficient legal description, in relevant part, as follow:
Defendant performed its obligations under the agreement. Plaintiff contends that
the doctrine of part performance is only applicable to save oral contracts, and is of
no help to Defendant because the lease agreement was 'Nritten. However, the
Idaho Supreme Court has considered a part performance claim in the context of a
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 10

written contract at least
P 'ship, 149 Idaho at 89.

1

Idaho at

Bauchman-Kingston

the
can save a
contract
statute of frauds. This seems sensible,
if part performance is
enforce an oral agreement, there is little reason to ignore the doctrine in cases
where the parties have at least attempted to reduce their agreement to writing,
albeit incompletely, and where the parties acted upon that agreement.
Defendant's lease is enforceable under the doctrine.
Plaintiff cites no authority for his proposition that the lease agreement,
enforceable under the doctrine of part performance, and which Plaintiff admitted
he was subject to when he bought the Knapps' property, is somehow
unenforceable now. The Court is unpersuaded by it
The lease suffers the same recording problem as the easement However, the
difference with the lease is that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of it As discussed
above, an unrecorded instrument is valid and enforceable against persons who
have notice of it Thus, the lease agreement is valid and enforceable against
Plaintiff. 2
In the case at hand, the Perpetual Easement Agreement was executed between Tiller
White's predecessor in interest, the Knapps, and Canyon Outdoor approximately three (3) years
before Tiller White acquired the property. The Knapps were clearly aware of the billboard sign,
accepted its presence on their property, received a lump sum payment and admitted that the
parties fully performed the terms of easement agreement. See R, pp 55 and 69. 3
Idaho law has long held that the initial selection of a place for an easement fixes its
physical location. See Manning v. Campbell, 152 Idaho 232,268 P.3d 1184 (2012), see also,
Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619,277 P. 542 (1929).

It is undisputed that Tiller White demanded Canyon Outdoor and the Knapps to relocate
the billboard sign to the other side of the Knapp's building away from its building. The billboard
sign was constructed and has been affixed in the ground in its current location for nearly thirteen
(13) years. The Knapps were paid a lump sum payment after they executed the Sign Lease and
2

See Memorandum Decision and Order, R., pp. 133-34.

3

References cited the Affidavits of Glen Knapp and Rachel Knapp.
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Perpetual Easement Agreement.

Dr.
Knapps

a

sum payment,

testified

was

aware

received and read the

before purchasing the property and that the Sign Lease was subject to Tiller White's
purchase of the property. See, R., pp. 85-88. 4
In addition, Canyon Outdoor's billboard sign continues to be permanently affixed
and located on the property and it expended substantial sums in constructing the
improvement. See, R., p. 37-38. 5 The value and construction costs of the billboard sign
was greater than 25% of what Tiller White paid for the entire property.
Tiller White acquired the property in March of 2006 and for nearly eight (8) years
since the filing of its complaint, it acknowledged, accepted and acquiesced to its presence
on the property despite now claiming that the Perpetual Easement Agreement was an
unenforceable agreement because it lacked a sufficient legal description. 6
The evidence in the record is uncontradicted that Canyon Outdoor fully
performed its obligations with Tiller White's predecessor-in-interest rendering the Statute
of Frauds inapplicable to the fully performed contract. See Frantz v. Parke, supra.
Also, the evidence in the record supports the finding that Canyon Outdoor, at a
minimum, performed its obligations under the agreement, constituting part performance
and satisfying the Statute of Frauds, rendering the Perpetual Easement Agreement
enforceable.
Based on the evidence in the record, the case authority cited herein and the

4 Reference cited in the Affidavit of Ed Guerricabeitia, Exhibit A (deposition of Dr. Tiller). More specifically, p. 16,
LI. 3-5, p. 21, LI. 20-23, p. 22, LI. 23-25, p. 23, LI. 1-25, p. 24, L. I and p. 29, LI. 9-13
5 Reference cited in the Affidavit of Curtis Massood.
6 Tiller White made the same argument concerning the enforceability of the Sign Lease for lack ofa sufficient legal
description which the district court held was the Sign Lease was enforceable against it.
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foregoing arguments, Canyon Outdoor respectfully requests this Court

that

performed complying with and satisfying the Statute of Frauds rendering
enforceable as a matter of law.

III. CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the law and legal arguments asserted in
its Appellant's Brief, the case law and legal arguments above, Canyon Outdoor respectfully
requests this Court enter its Order as follows:
1)

Reversing the district court's ruling that Tiller White was a bona fide purchaser

under the statutes and in favor of Canyon Outdoor possessing an enforceable easement having
priority and prevailing over Tiller White's interest under Idaho Code§ 55-815; and

2)

That the Perpetual Easement Agreement is enforceable under the doctrines of part

performance and/or full performance satisfying Idaho Code§ 9-503.
DATED this

3rd

day of February, 2016.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
ED GUERRICABEITIA, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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